Sai Tun Aung Lwin
(A) Denying is rejoining
Sao Loi Mao former Shan State Army’s leader was rarely seen in the media appearing once in a blue moon. So, it wouldn’t be surprising if some of the Shan people thought that he was in frail, or his forces were not in avail for the Shan people’s cause. His forces transformed into a militia under the Army’s northeastern command around 2010.
But his recent appearances are unusual.
The first time was along with the Military junta’s chief in Lashio, a military command city fallen into the ethnic rebels lately, over a year ago, and the latter when he is rejoining his mother organization the SSA Shan State Army, the oldest Shan ethnic rebel group.
In the post-coup context, those militias and BGF (Border Guard Forces) roles are important for both the Junta’s military and the opposition.
From the start of the upheaval in 2021, Min Aung Hlaing has been visiting around the countryside in his allies’ stronghold areas, especially militias, and BGFs.
Last year Northern Shan Trip ahead of Operation 1027, the Junta chief met with prominent local militia leaders. The origin of each militia group is not the same, some were created by the Army and Government. A few have come from the transformation of Ethnic armed groups. Among leaders of Northern Shan base Groups met with Ming Aung Hlaing in Lashio, one is former SSA Shan State Army’s leader Sao Loi Mao.
The former SSA chairperson led two SSA brigades to transform into militias under Army control around 2010 due to the reason of the Army’s huge pressure, according to a source of Sein Gyawt militia. Sao Loi Mao and his force were named as Sein Gyawt militia.
But they retained some conditions; they never went out of their control area view to fight against ethnic armed rebel groups and did not involve any fighting over ten years.
Owing to the army having accepted these conditions, they decided to transform into a people militia group. In 2023, the last time he met with the Junta Chief Min Aung Hlaing turns to conniving the agreements and lured them into Conflicts against ethnic armed groups. The method he used was offering incentives and positions. In that meeting, he offered Sao Loi Mao to accept the position of commander in charge of Northern Shan base militia groups. But Sao Loi Mao denied it by giving reasons including his deteriorated health conditions and their agreement which over ten years ago between their group and Tatmadaw.
If he accepted, his group would have more than likely received businesses concessions and benefits from the government. But the problem is their group would likely have had to dispatch troops whenever the Tatmadaw summoned them to reinforce in Fighting against ethnic armed groups or PDFs force. This motive might be more conducive to dividing relations between Sao Loi Mao-led Sein Gyawt Militia and his old group the SSPP/SSA actively armed rebel group. Otherwise, he could be a figurehead of Tatmadaw’s persuasive evil allies who come from former foes. Even Min Aung Hlaing this method couldn’t work with Sao Loi Mao, it was workable in Southern Shan on Pa-oh National Organization and its’ militia Pa-oh National Army. After over a year of that meeting, Sao Loi Mao appeared again. At this time, the media highlighted him and his forces as a militia backed by the Myanmar regime defects to Shan armed group.
The Sein Gyawt militia, formerly Brigade 3 of the Shan State Progressive Party rejoined with its’ mother Group, the SSPP/SSA on 6 September of 2024.
(Figure.1 Groups that were transformed as BGF or Militias around 2010) (Notes among them, except PNO Pa-O National Army and NDAK New Democratic Army-Kachin, all of transformed groups in Northern Burma reintegrated into their mother Organizations (Ethnic rebel Groups). Kokang BGF was disbanded by Kokang rebel MNDAA in 2023. (REF. John Buchanan 2016, Militias in Myanmar). (Notes, NDAK New Democratic Army Kachin Transformed BGFs were toppled by KIA Led allies in 2024 October.)
(B) What are the real motives of reintegration to ethnic rebel groups?
For the Sein Gyawt militia, at least three factors had them pushed to re-integration with SSA:
- They are in the crossfire positions between the SAC forces and the Northern Alliance Ethnic Rebels (Three Brotherhoods Alliance Ethnic Rebels).
- When war came to their threshold, resisting their old allies such as Kokang MNDAA was inevitable. Among leaders’ connectivity, Sao Loi Mao and the late Peng Jia Sheng (MNDAA Kokang rebel leader) were the same blocs under the communist Party of Burma dominant in the Northern Burma era. From this Perspective, the Kokang MNDAA would give them pardonably, even if they attacked an army outpost in their militia headquarters located in HsiPaw township.
- Sometimes the mess conditions would pave the way to National solidarity. The Shan people in Northern Shan State, are living in the crossfire among multiple armed groups. It would be restrengthened for the aging Shan armed group, the SSPP/SSA.
- It is concerning their original worldview. The Question of “Why these informal local government institutions, such as some militias are going to be integrated into rebels”? The answer is their embedded ideology and political stance. For instance, they accepted the conditions were forced by the Myanmar military around 2010 pressures were irresistible and grin and bear it for the former two of the SSA brigades, at that time Myanmar’s State institutions were effective in forcibly integrating. But When the State institution itself much weakened and uncertainties came up, those who were forcibly integrated are jostling to escape under the Myanmar military control. So, like as various militias who were transformed from ethnic rebels now become rebels again. In northern Shan, the Man Ton militia was brought into TNLA, Kaung Kha KDA militia into KIA, and MNDAA is a good example. In Karenni, KNPLF BGF is revolting against the Myanmar Military now. Once, a KNPLF BGF leader told us that accepting transformation under military control BGF would be interim. Now it become true. KNPLF transformed BGF infantries (No. 1004, and No. 1005) defected to join opposition to fight against the Myanmar military in 2023 June.
All of these groups faced scant liberalization and forcible assimilation as Myanmar Tatmadaw’s road map over a decade ago.
(C) Can it be workable for a failed integration policy to be revived?
When we glance militia presence in Myanmar, it would probably a bit confusing seeing varied kinds of militia Groups. But typologically, we could classify 4 categories:
Tatmadaw-Integrated militias
Tatmadaw non-integrated militias
Tatmadaw-supported community militias
Ethnic armed organization militias
(REF, John Buchanan 2016)
All of the transformed militias or Border Guard forces who are former Ethnic rebels encompass Tatmadaw-integrated militias and Non-integrated militias.
Abovementioned, we underscored and described Groups are People militias or BGFs Border Guard Forces, who have been transformed from ethnic armed revolutionary groups.
Militias have been part of armed conflicts in Myanmar for over six decades. Despite their long-term presence, however much of information about militia is unavailable.
Analysis of Myanmar affairs have generally neglected these militia groups. The great multitudes of militias in Myanmar make it impossible to deal with the subject in any detail within the scope of one short lesson. (For instance, Militia Glossary: Tha Ka Sa Pha Anti-insurgent groups, Border Guard Forces, Home Guard or Ka-Kwe-Ye, People militias Forces, Pyu Saw Hti, etc,)
Over the 10 years from 2011-21, Myanmar partially loosened political and economic restrictions and became somewhat democratic. But in contrast to the central heartland, the Northern Shan region was marred by turmoil with conflict and fighting.
It is interesting why the fighting flared up even when elections and parliaments had been revived.
Some Journalists thought ethnic conflicts and civil-war problems would be solved if NLD came to power, but this was completely wrong and fighting didn’t cease in the NLD Gov era.
The cause for the resumed fighting in Northern Myanmar was stemming the military’s pressure on ethnic armed groups to transform into border guard forces or people’s militias under the command of Tatmadaw as the constitution had been enacted and democratization was happening.
Except for Kokang BGF, all of the forcibly transformed Militia and Border Guard Force in Northern Shan (Who originated from Ethnic Resistance groups) re-incorporated and integrated their mother units (Ethnic rebel Groups) now.
At the Democratization Context:
Countries that are undergoing democratic transition often end up with war and conflicts rather than peace. The reasons for this are the weak institutions such as the executive, legislative, and judiciary
4.John Buchanan (2016), Militia in Myanmar, The Asia Foundation, Yangon, p. VIII
branches that are important pillars for the transformation to democracy in these countries and the presence of marginalized groups which increases the likelihood of war.
Myanmar’s military chief, Min Aung Hlaing, is reviving an old strategy—inviting insurgent groups to join elections, much like in 2010. Back then, several groups transitioned into legal entities under military oversight. Today, only two remain in this position: the Pa-O National Organization (PNO), which enjoys administrative autonomy while operating as a pro-junta militia, and the New Democracy Army-Kachin (NDAK), whose headquarters in Pan Wa was recently seized by Kachin Independence Army-led forces. In Shan State, most existing militias originated from Khun Sa’s Mong Tai Army (MTA), unlike groups such as Sao Loi Mao’s militia or Kaung Kha KDA, which have roots in the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). Even the Ta’ang National Party (TNP) and the Man Ton militia—formed by the Palaung—have remained politically inactive, with the TNP refusing to register under the junta-controlled election commission. Their limited engagement in the peace process underscores Myanmar’s failed attempts at forced national integration. Militias and Border Guard Forces (BGFs) have historically shifted loyalties in times of crisis. Figures like Khun Sa and Lao Hsit Han—both drug kingpins turned into rebels when under pressure. Today, Saw Chit Thu, the notorious BGF leader in southern Myanmar, faces mounting scrutiny over online scams and human trafficking.
While militias generally align with the military, inconsistencies remain. Some groups, like the pro-junta Shanni Nationality Army (SNA), have been offered more autonomy, while the PNO Pa.Oh National Militia enjoys special privileges reminiscent of the military government era (1988-2010). A similar geopolitical dynamic played out in northern Myanmar between 2009-2010, when China backed the military-led transition and forced militia transformations. However, Myanmar’s brutal human rights violations have since strained relations. The 2009 Kokang riots are a prime example—China initially allowed military operations but faced backlash from ethnic Chinese in Yunnan after heavy civilian casualties.
Now the situation is much different. Mainland Burmese, once calming and shrugging off events of military groups’ oppression of the ethnic groups, are growing grievances and rebellions against the Myanmar military. Coincidentally, the Junta chief vows to use the militia system as a tool. Raging in the civil war of Northern Burma, most of the militia groups’ positions and existences are becoming much of uncertainties. Post-coup conflicts and emerging various armed groups cause more challenges over the Security sector reform (SSR) issue as it were before 2020 is a state of difficulty to solve.
groups cause more challenges over the Security sector reform (SSR) issue as it were before 2020 is a state of difficulty to solve.
One question remains: what will happen to military-allied militias in the future after the SAC junta era?
