In the decisive battle for Arakan, the Arakan Army (AA) successfully captured all military bases, including the Western Regional Military Command Headquarters in Ann Township, on December 20 at 1:40 PM.
Additionally, the Arakan Army took complete control of the Myan mar junta’s bases in Taunggoke Township, including the No. 5 Operations Command Headquarters, on December 14 at 4:10 PM.
The Arakan Army (AA) also successfully captured the No. 5 Border Guard Police Battalion in Maungdaw Township, located along the Arakan-Bangladesh border, on December 8 at 9:30 AM.
Following the intensified territorial campaigns by the Arakan Army, the Myanmar junta was observed to increase its efforts in spreading divisive propaganda.
As the Arakan Army (AA) launches offensives to secure complete control over the Arakan-Ayeyarwaddy border, the Myanmar junta has intensified its divisive propaganda, focusing primarily on ethn icity and religion.
Propagandists of the Myanmar junta have reportedly been spre ading divisive narratives among the Chin communities in Ann Township, accusing the Arakan Army of promoting discord.
Similarly, there are allegations that Chin villagers in Ann Township are being forcibly detained and conscripted by the AA into military labor under the guise of these campaigns.
The Myanmar junta’s lobbying networks, including Telegram acco unts such as Han Nyein Oo, Min Chit Oo, Thazin Oo, May Yu Htar Nay, Min Bar Gyi, Ko Thet, and Kyaw Swar, have been spreading daily misinformation and divisive propaganda about the Arakan conflict.
Furthermore, during the battles for control of Ann Township, it has been observed that the junta frequently disseminates ethnic-based divisive narratives targeting allied revolutionary armed groups from the Spring Revolution that are supporting the offensives.
The Myanmar junta has been focusing its divisive propaganda efforts on the allies of the Arakan Army, including the Asho Chin Defense Force (ACDF), the New Society Army (NSA), the People’s Liberation Army (PIA), and the People’s Revolutionary Alliance (PRA-Magway), as well as the Student Armed Force (SAF). These groups have been specifically targeted with ethnic-based narratives to sow discord.
On November 13, the Telegram account “Min Bar Gyi” published a piece of divisive misinformation, claiming: “The defeated AA, losing heavily in Rakhine, lures central-region PDFs in Pauk and Myaing Townships with promises of weapons, drugs them, and forces them to fight at the front lines in the Ann battles, resulting in heavy casualties. Demoralized Burmese PDFs are shot if they attempt to flee.”
The “Min Bar Gyi” Telegram channel, which has 355 members, emerged in late April 2024 as a pro-military lobbying platform. It consistently publishes divisive content centered on ethnicity and religion.
This military propaganda channel, under the guise of promoting “truthful news to defend the western gate,” actively spreads hate speech aimed at driving wedges between the Arakan Army (AA) and its allies, as well as between the AA and the public.
In addition to spreading misinformation, the Myanmar junta’s propagandists have intensified their divisive narratives since the beginning of the Arakan conflict. They have increasingly targeted both the National Unity Government (NUG) and its armed forces, aiming to create rifts within these groups.
Propaganda channels on Telegram have also claimed that some battalions under the Ministry of Defence (MOD) of the NUG have defected to the Arakan Army (AA). These channels derogatorily referred to them as “mercenaries drinking from a poisoned well,” further fueling disunity through their messaging.
In the decisive Arakan conflict, the Arakan Army (AA) has taken full control of 14 major towns, including the Paletwa region, and is on the verge of capturing Gwa Township completely.
In the past, whenever the Myanmar junta faced setbacks, it resorted to sowing discord through ethnic and religious propaganda. This included spreading misinformation and divisive narratives to create rifts between revolutionary groups or between these groups and the local population.
When the strategic hills in Paletwa Township fell, there were efforts to spread divisive hate and incite conflict between the Rakhine and Chin communities, as well as between the Arakan Army (AA) and the Chin revolutionary groups. These propagandist actions were aimed at fostering ethnic and ideological divisions to escalate tensions.
In its October 2024 report, titled “Ethnic Conflicts – A Push for Military Dictatorship,” the Nyan Lin Thit research team, which closely monitors Myanmar’s political situation, clearly outlines the ethnic-based divisive actions being carried out by the Myanmar junta in Rakhine.
In its report, the Nyan Lin Thit research team highlighted that after the Arakan Army (AA) declared Paletwa a Myanmar junta-free zone on January 14, 2024, clashes between some Chin revolutionary groups, Chin communities, and the AA broke out in the Paletwa region. These incidents were exploited by military propaganda channels, which spread divisive narratives not only between the Rakhine and Chin communities but also among different Chin groups, exacerbating ethnic conflict.
Portrayal of ethnic hatred as a conflict
When the junta units in Kyauktaw Township were lost, the Arakan Army (AA) seized the naval boats from the Kalatan River, which was used as a tool to spread ethnic conflict narratives between the Rakh ine and Burmese communities.
This propaganda was disseminated not only on social media but also in urban areas, continuously fueling ethnic tensions.
The Nyan Lin Thit research team’s report states that the Myanmar junta has concealed the fact that its family members were rescued by the Arakan Army (AA) and, in an attempt to escalate ethnic conflict, fabricated a narrative claiming that the AA systematically massacred the Burmese people, thus further fueling tensions.
The Nyan Lin Thit research team’s report states that, instead of focusing on the battles between the junta forces and the Arakan Army (AA), as well as the conflict between the military dictatorship and revolutionary groups, certain Telegram channels supporting the junta have portrayed the conflict as ethnic hatred and violence between the Burmese and Rakhine communities. This narrative aims to fuel further divisions and animosity.
The report states that a narrative was widely spread, claiming that the Rakhine people massacred the Burmese with ethnic hatred, and this story was used to create ethnic animosity against the Rakhine community.
The Nyan Lin Thit research team’s report states that a supporter of the military junta, Bullet Hla Swe, expressed that they no longer wanted to eat Rakhine food or see Rakhine people, saying that whenever they heard the word “Rakhine,” they felt hatred. This narrative was used to further fuel ethnic conflict.
In Yangon and Mandalay, junta supporters posted placards urging people not to eat Rakhine food or buy from Rakhine-owned busi nesses. This led to increased concern among the Rakhine comm unity, who had been living peacefully, working, and providing for their families within the country.
However, the Myanmar junta’s divisive ethnic and religious rhetoric has not had the desired effect on the public, who are now aware of the junta’s efforts to incite hatred. The propaganda has not been successful in inciting widespread hostility.
The increasingly desperate Myanmar junta continues to resort to ethnic and religious divisive rhetoric every time it faces defeat, using it to incite further violence and encourage ethnic-based bombings and killings.
The 1027 military operation involving the Arakan Army and its allied forces began on November 13, 2023, when they launched an attack on a junta checkpoint along the Maungdaw-Ah Ngu Maw Road. Following this, the Myanmar junta blocked transportation and goods supply routes, effectively cutting off key transportation links in Rakhine.
As a result, humanitarian assistance has been blocked, and people are facing various hardships, struggling with a lack of essential support and resources.
The people of Arakan are suffering from a lack of medical supplies, with many dying unnecessarily. They are also enduring the severe impact of soaring commodity prices and the lack of job opport unities, relying on donations just to survive.
In addition, the Myanmar junta has left landmines in abandoned military camps, strategic points, and troop positions. As a result, civilians who have taken refuge in the forests are continuously facing the danger of mine explosions.
The Myanmar junta’s propagandists have been encouraging airst rikes in the Arakan region, urging relentless and violent actions.
In December, they repeatedly advocated for this approach, stating: “In warfare, only the ruthless can prevail. If you want to win, be ruth less and brutal; that is the way.” This rhetoric aims to incite extreme violence and further escalate the conflict.
“For Rakhine, AA is merely an ethnic issue disguised as Rakhine and Burmese. In reality, when looking back at history, it is clear that the ideology of the Burmese kings was what established empires and nations, and it was the Burmese military that fought for and secu red independence.” Based on the Burmese ethnic supremacist ideology, this has been promoted by the Myanmar junta’s supp orters through their propaganda channels.
Additionally, “If we can carry out land, water, and air attacks in central Rakhine, the situation regarding Rakhine will change.” “It’s not something we can stop or leave alone. What’s happening now is an ethnic conflict for the Rakhine.” These words, focused on ethnic issues, were written on December 7th on a Telegram channel named Kyaw Swar.
Thazin Oo wrote on December 9th, stating that they strongly advo cate for using the most intense methods and heavy weapons to eliminate the Arakan Army.
In the junta military’s propaganda Telegram channels, ethnic divi sive rhetoric and hateful speeches encouraging the killing of civil ians are seen on a daily basis.
Rakhine residents report that, in addition to the cities under the complete control of the Arakan Army, airstrikes are also being carried out on cities currently under attack.
Residents of Thandwe have reported that on the night of December 23, around 3:00 AM, the Myanmar junta launched an airstrike on Thandwe, which is under the full control of the Arakan Army (AA). As a result, one local was killed and six others were injured.
According to a statement issued on November 18 by the Humanitarian Assistance and Development Cooperation Office (HDCO) of the Arakan People’s Revolutionary Government, the Myanmar junta’s military, in its targeted airstrikes during the decisive battles in Arakan, deliberately destroyed approximately 6,500 homes, including 21 markets, leading to widespread devastation among the local population.
The Myanmar junta, facing defeats and with lower-ranking soldiers demoralized and dissatisfied, has been observed spreading propa ganda through Telegram channels.
Amid ongoing defections and demoralization among military personnel and their families, the Myanmar junta has been consistently spreading false news through Telegram channels, aiming to boost the morale of its forces by falsely reporting that the Arakan Army (AA) is facing defeat.
There are reports of the Myanmar junta spreading propaganda about the destruction of religious structures and civilian shelters, including monasteries where IDPs (internally displaced persons) are taking refuge, by bombs weighing 500 and 1000 pounds, in an effort to mislead people and claim responsibility for targeting Arakan Army (AA) positions.
Additionally, the Myanmar junta, which is losing in the Arakan war, has been arresting active Rakhine ethnic figures, former military officers, and even singers. This includes encouraging such arrests through the Myanmar military’s supporting Telegram channels.
On November 26, a former Rakhine police officer residing in Tharkayta Township, Yangon Region, was arrested for allegedly writing propaganda supporting the Arakan Army.
Additionally, a Rakhine female singer, a youth leader from the Arakan National Party, and Rakhine student activists were also arrested in Yangon. They are facing charges under anti-terrorism laws.
In reality, the people are not spreading hatred based on ethnicity or religion. It is only the supporters of the junta who are promoting such hateful ideologies. They are creating problems among the peaceful people living together. They believe that if they can sow hatred and conflict among the people, they will be able to maintain their control over power. However, one local citizen said that the people will not accept this like before.”
”Although the Myanmar junta spreads propaganda claiming that the Arakan Army is targeting civilians, recruiting ethnic groups, and killing Muslims, the people on the ground have witnessed the Ara kan Army’s actions of warning civilians before battles and rescuing them. Because of these actions, the people do not believe the junta’s propaganda,” they said.
A Muslim from Buthidaung Township stated, ”The people in Rak hine, who are living peacefully together, accept the Arakan Army’s equal opportunity policy regardless of ethnic or religious differe nces. At this point, no one will fall into the trap of ethnic or relig ious division.”
There have been concerns that while the Myanmar military’s ethnic division propaganda has not been effective in Rakhine, it remains a worrying issue for Rakhine people living outside the region.
Some have reported that individuals holding identification docu ments representing Rakhine state, such as 11/—, are facing ethnic discrimination at military checkpoints, with issues like being denied bus tickets or subjected to ethnic-based treatment during travel. These experiences were shared by those who have personally encountered such discrimination.
According to a former member of parliament, these actions repr esent a clear violation of the constitutional principles and human rights in the country, particularly in terms of ethnic division and oppression. He argues that the junta’s actions go against the fund amental rights of citizens.
Additionally, the junta’s propaganda channels have been spreading messages of frustration, fear, and despair, while continuing to prom ote ethnic hatred and division through hateful language, aiming to further incite ethnic supremacy among the Burmese people.
Experts who monitor and study military junta’s propaganda suggest that while the ethnic division policies of the Myanmar junta have not been successful in Arakan’s final battles, the junta’s supporters will likely continue promoting these divisive ideologies. They argue that the junta’s ongoing efforts to spread ethnic and religious hatred will persist, further exacerbating tensions in the region.
