Sai Tun Aung Lwin

Lashio,April 5.

(A) A story of Iraq’s Tal Afar or a blip of Bright Spot

In unpacking such a problem so that might to solve such intricacies problem, we need to know what is underlying problems and complex group power dynamics and structure. The FPNCC is not a front and not an ideological base coalition. But fortunately, the PRC authority’s influence upon these groups may get restrained to some extent of inter-ethnic conflicts from intense. At some points, it needs converging restraint inclusive structure, and vision of peaceful coexistence.

For instance, Tal Afar is a lonely bright spot successful area in years of sustained US military losses in IRAQ’s most regions.

Mac Master, a US Colnel who would later become Trump Administration’s security advisor, was managed to build inclusive local Governance system and trust among communities that prevent the porous of extremism and terrorists.

It is no means easy to convince Sunni and Shiite to work together. First, the Shiite sheiks to convince them that the Americans could be counted on to secure their neighborhood and then the Sunni Sheiks, many of whom were passive or active supporters of the insurgency. To begin with, He required his troops to take detailed crash courses in local group customs, practice, and attitudes, as well as strictly prohibited his soldiers from using derogatory terms. Some troops had to take the Arabic language and ordered hundred copies of History of IRAQ.

Mc Master began building alliances with crucial leaders. By wedgeing moderate and extremist Sunnis and persuading Sunni and Shiite tribal sheiks to cooperate, Tal Afar had become stabilized, and sectarian violence had fallen. This area was a milestone large-scale counterinsurgencies initiative area.

(B) Northern Shan’s post-1027 operation context

The Northern Shan, where there are at least five ethnic communities, each with their own distinct group identities, historical memories, and divergent groups.

In Myanmar, the borderlands, the territorial control of the state is now crumbling Many revolutionary/resistance movements are trying to establish new forms of political rule to reach a federal democracy. But this is occurring based on an ethnonational logic that sees ethnonational movements claiming the authority to develop autonomous areas for different ethnic groups. 

For the northern Shan State, each independent political entity is made up of different ethnic groups.    Populations and armed organizations are primarily defined along their ethnicities, as opposed to their residential communities or geographic locations.

Kachin (or Jing Phaw) in the Northern Shan aspire to re-establish their former political systems at the local governance level while carving out an autonomous region or state.

Not only did many Kachin in northern Shan want to carve out an autonomous area, but the Ta’ ang Palaung rebel (TNLA Ta’ang National Liberation Army) also seeks to establish a slice of the region to create their autonomous state.   This group has envisaged boundaries beyond the current borders of the Palaung autonomous region located in the Northern Shan.  Their expansionistic visions encompass the territories of some formerly Kachin sub-states areas.  Han ethnic Chinese, Kokang-backed MNDAA rebels want a similar arrangement like Ta’ang.

For instance, in December 2023, the TNLA Ta’ang rebel group backed by UWSA seized control of Namhsan in the Northern Shan. The town’s mostly Ta’ang Palaung population likely hailed them as liberators. But by then, they had already begun to expand into Shan—and Kachin-inhabited areas, and today’s problems arose.

Even post-1027 local governance administrations Structured by TNLA Ta’ang and MNDAA Kokang have based on self-rules instead of inclusiveness. But both face Strategic dilemmas between military and territory expansion is one hand, and power consolidation in new territory is on the other.

A weak check and balance system, limited resources, pressures on its economic activities, and existing inter-ethnic tensions still serve as significant challenges for both the two.

(C) Which types they are implementing?

Some EAOs have also implemented economic policies to facilitate trade and economic transactions in their newly expanded territories. For example, in Mogoke Township in the Mandalay Region, the PSLF-TNLA has reportedly banned small- and large-scale mining or prospecting while drafting policies to support environmental conservation. It has also reportedly taken action against illegal gem mining and trading, as well as required businesses to apply for new permits in order to deal with rising commodity prices and shortages of goods. The MNTJP/MNDAA likewise has set fixed prices for meat and fish products while the PSLF/ TNLA has reportedly exempted taxes on goods imported to areas under its control from other parts of Myanmar.

This kind of EAO direct governance is often associated with claims to radical autonomy. For example, both the AA (which controls most of Rakhine State) and UWSA (which controls a large swathe of central and northern Shan State, as well as significant conclaves along the Thailand

border) subscribe to a form of “confederationism”, predicated on the recognition of sovereign EAO authority. One of the main challenges for this type of direct EAO governance is how to engage with “other” ethno- linguistic/nationality communities. For instance, the AA’s relationship with the Rohingya community has been problematic. ( REF, Ardeth M. Thawnghmung and Ashley South)

(D) Outside factors and northern Shan History

When we look back on the History of northern Shan’s history some forms of territorial competition have been more or less alike occurred even in the pre-colonial era. Especially among three groups: Kachin, Ta’ang and Koakang relations and paint history each other are not good.

The tension between the different ethnic groups in Northern Shan is not at the level of Balkanization where one ethnic group attacks the other on sight, but different ethnic groups continue to be locked in an impasse. Since 1962, it has been observed that these paradoxes, ambivalences, and deadlocks subside at intervals only to be revived through another tension when any change (or) weakened central power or event that has a major impact on the region occurs.

The region was also shaped by the changes in the surrounding neighboring countries and Myanmar’s major incidents. ( For instance, the 1959 Shan state Sao Fahs ( Princes ) abdication and 1962 coup spawned ethnic rebellions across the Northern Shan. KMT intrusion and the Chinese CCP backed Communist Party of Burma appeared in Northern made commotions of conflict patterns in Shan State. Likewise, resume China-Burma trade and the 1990’s ceasefire in Northern Shan as well.)

Especially post-independence era becoming a modern state, China’s role is important.

Northern Shan’s reality and territorial control groups have ever changed.

The current motive for the ceasefire deal between 3BHA and the SAC junta is not congruent. Besides, China’s mediation and its’ consent or favor groups are not the same.

Above chart shows three major blocs in the northern Shan’s outlooks and game plans. ( Excerpted- ISP Myanmar’s presentation )

But for the China, they recognizes MNDAA Kokang’s autonomy in Kokang and some of the western Salween river area, not including the northern Shan capital Lashio. But for PSLF/TNLA, the PRC denies their demand for State-level autonomy to be promoted. Besides, they don’t want to see any rebel forces encampment along the Lashio-Mandalay road where three townships are captured by TNLA and PDFs.

So, it isn’t surprising that TNLA growing its discontent with China. But they are grim and bear with it as they are seeking a Liaison office to be opened in Chiang Mai and technical support from USIP through the Ta’ang Political Consultative Council.

For the SAC, their plan is clear, their consent is linked up with post-election their breakthrough plan. 

(E) Nexus between other groups in the region

Significantly tension arising with TNLA groups are KIA, and the SSPP. But for the SSPP/SSA shan group, marginalized by other groups by the rhetoric of not involving Burma’s spring revolution, was cautious not to be trapped between the SAC Junta and TNLA. Ta’ang media and some of TNLA’s affiliated new outlets want to have SSPP painted as reactionary or intrigued with the SAC junta as if.

Another powerhouse group, KIA Kachin Independence Army is streetwise and was managed to convince their sympathizers and Burma Spring’s supporters as innocent their presence in the northern Shan. Even in TNLA’s inner circle, it is significantly two groups emerging. Their attitude toward Shan and Kachin are not the same between these two of factions. One group is who want to always follow what UWSA’ guidance and protect Wa’s interests in the Northern Shan even as view of doing to wiping out other rival groups. The second group want to maintain normal relations and seek another accessible point outside of China’s premises without having apprehension of China’s Radar.

For the MNDAA they still trying to maintain a good relationship with the SSPP/SSA. But they want to justify as the people of Lashio accept their annexation of Lashio by means of a Sham mass rally by forcibly to take place.

( F ) Does it have an entry point?

Now Myanmar is disassembled. Likewise Some parts of Shan State too. The instructions for assembly_ the constitutions of 1917, 1974, 2008_ are no longer adequate. International response to failed or failing state is largely Characterized by confusion and disappointment. Beyond the divergence of political ideologies (Non interference from China or the consensus of ASEAN) lies a surprising lack of theoretical capacity to cope with what are typically complex, multi-layered crises.

Understanding the war in Myanmar primarily as fight for democracy is reductionist to the point that it risk misunderstanding its drivers, dynamics and potential solutions. State centric approach or liberal approach can’t be solve Myanmar and Shan state problems too. In fact, Myanmar or Northern Shan is moving in a chaotic self-induced and destructive path.

But that would be possible using approach polycentric method to solve problems of the Northern Shan.  A poly centric analysis has the merits of identifying entry points for policy which can effect smaller-scale, localized interventions which retain the potential to contribute to an as yet unclear, emergent future.

Another challenging aspect of the post-coup situation is overlapping areas of authority between different governance and political actors, and competition for territorial control, with some EAOs expanding their areas of control into regions populated by members of other ethnic groups. Competition over resources and political control have led to tensions—and sometimes quite serious armed clashes—between groups. Resources and efforts should focus on promoting inclusive local political participation, mitigating abuses and the impunity of non-state armed actors as well as addressing tensions and hostility emerging from overlapped areas of authorities among anti-junta forces. A good place to start may be to focus on the borders or frontiers between overlapping liberated areas and try to find local solutions which suit both communities and political authorities. (REF, Ashley South)

It may be in accordance with the assemblage notion using so that to solve its’ nature of complexity. Where the state has failed, fragmented or simply faded away, the reality of governance without government may become a more permanent reality and, at the same time subject to multiple changes in form.

The first seeks to define, as far as possible through a consensus approach, a common goal, pathway and structure; the second enable a framework which can accommodate multiple goals which may overlap, and where the common goal emerges from overlapping and relationship, rather than being pre-determined.

This approach does not presume that the final desired form would be a recognizable ‘state’; multiple possibilities continue to exist, determined by the relationship between different elements, and between different assemblages themselves. For Myanmar context: what may emerge from the current context is as yet undetermined: multiple independent statelets; a relatively coherent federal union; or a looser confederation of semi-autonomous territories.